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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3339
___________
KHALID ELAROUSSI, 
                                     Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                    Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A077-028-718)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 5, 2010
Before:   AMBRO, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed May 21, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Khalid Elaroussi petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review.
Elaroussi, a citizen of Morocco, entered the United States in 1991 as a visitor.  In
22002, he was charged as removable for overstaying his admission period.  The
government later added a charge that Elaroussi was removable for committing marriage
fraud.  After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained both charges and denied
Elaroussi’s requests for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure on the ground
that he lacked good moral character.  On appeal, the BIA agreed with the IJ and dismissed
the appeal.  Elaroussi filed a timely petition for review.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the BIA’s factual
determinations under the substantial evidence standard.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228,
249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  The BIA’s findings are considered conclusive unless “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).  We exercise de novo review over the BIA’s legal decisions.  Toussaint
v. Att’y General, 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006).
 Elaroussi argues that the findings that he had provided false testimony and
committed marriage fraud are not supported by substantial evidence because he explained
the inaccuracies in the documentary evidence.  Elaroussi acknowledges that the
government presented evidence which would constitute clear and convincing evidence of
marriage fraud if not rebutted.  The government submitted a letter from Elaroussi’s ex-
wife who stated that she entered into a sham marriage to help Elaroussi obtain
immigration benefits.  It also submitted a letter from Fleet Bank which indicated that
Elaroussi and his ex-wife opened an account in June 1995 as well as a lease agreement
signed by Elaroussi and his ex-wife dated October 1996.  These two documents
3contradicted his testimony that he met his wife in 1997. 
Elaroussi argues that he rebutted the above evidence with his testimony that the
bank letter must be incorrect.  He also points to a statement from his ex-wife asserting
that the landlord added Elaroussi to her existing two-year lease and that they had a bank
account at Fleet Bank before they were married.  The ex-wife’s statement was not
considered by the BIA because it had not been submitted to the IJ.  Elaroussi’s testimony
that the bank letter was incorrect does not compel a reversal of the finding that he
committed marriage fraud and gave false testimony.
Elaroussi challenges the denial of his application for cancellation of removal.  He
argues that his explanations of inaccuracies in the government’s evidence did not justify a
finding of perjury.  He also contends that the determination that he gave false testimony is
not sufficient to justify a finding that he lacked good moral character because the
testimony was given to explain inaccuracies in the government’s evidence.  We have
jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law but not factual or
discretionary determinations related to the determination that Elaroussi lacked good moral
character.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) & (a)(2)(D); see Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft,
338 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2003).  To the extent that Elaroussi is raising a legal argument that
his testimony could not be considered false because it was made in rebuttal, we reject this
argument.  Moreover, we note that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), an alien cannot be
considered a person of good moral character if he gives false testimony for the purpose of
obtaining immigration benefits.
4Elaroussi also contends that the marriage fraud does not render him ineligible for
cancellation of removal because the fraud occurred more than ten years ago.  However,
the IJ specifically found that the lack of good character continued until the day of the
hearing when Elaroussi lied about when he met his wife, when they moved in together,
and whether the marriage was bona fide.  A.R. at 4, 111-12.  Moreover the IJ noted that
the marriage fraud continued until March 31, 1999, within ten years of the April 2008
hearing, when Elaroussi and his then wife were interviewed by the INS.  A.R. at 111. 
The BIA agreed that the marriage fraud and the “plainly incredible testimony provided
under oath” warranted a determination that Elaroussi lacked good moral character during
the ten-year period at issue.  A.R. at 4. 
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
